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The main objective of this paper is to show that when countries conforming 
a block that makes what some specialists have called: regionalism or integration -- 
having between them big asymmetries -- the policy to threat to leave the block can 
be a very efficient policy for those countries more harmed by the presence of such 
asymmetries. In particular in this article we analyze the current situation inside of 
the Southern Common Market or at it is better known in Latin America as 
MERCOSUR.  
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El principal objetivo de este trabajo es el de mostrar que en el caso en que 
varios  países conformen un  bloque comercial  con  grandes asimetrías, puede ser 
de gran utilidad para los países menos favorecidos por ellas, usar una estrategia 
que amenace con  retirarse del acuerdo. Es el caso de economías pequeñas que no 
pueden tomar represalias contra las grandes economías en casos en que éstas, 
guiadas por su propio interés, no cumplan acuerdos previamente establecidos. 
Ciertamente esta amenaza tiene que ser creíble.  
En el trabajo se muestra que en el caso del MERCOSUR puede ser esta una 
estrategia conveniente para Uruguay, desde que este puede firmar tratados de 
libre comercio.  
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In this article we argue that under certain circumstances, when countries 
that face big asymmetries compose a block, the policy to threaten to leave the 
block can be, for them an optimal policy to avoid non-fulfillment of commitments 
(or defections in terms of the game theory) on the part of the large and powerful 
economies that feel unpunishable. The argument comes from the theory of games 
in particular of the so called: "strategies with credible threats". In this sense, the 
existence of big asymmetries with unequal relative economic weight within block, 
big differences in the level of development among the states involved in the 
agreement, or not equal shared information, is a source of weakness or 
impossibility of long existence for these blocks. It is possible to argue that the 
s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  ( U E )  i s  b a s e d  o n  w h a t  i s  k n o w n  a s  E u r o p e a n  
values which mean equality among the members of the Union towards adequate 
development, shared information and social welfare, and that the source of 
weakness of MERCOSUR and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
is the big asymmetries between the members that compose these blocks, as well 
as, the remarkably poor compromise of the big economies towards the 
development of the small economies, that make asymmetries even worse among 
American countries. Certainly several sentences of the Treaty of Rome of 1957 
allude that some of the main objectives of the EU are to impel prosperity and 
social welfare among the members states of the Western Union, fomenting the 
pace, prosperity and equilibrium among them, that in the short and long term 
created what some social scientists have called after the end of the Cold War: 
economic security (1). As is well known, some institutions of the EU such as: the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Funds, the 
European Investment Bank, and the European Investment Funds, play a very 
important role to smooth asymmetries among the member states of the Union. For 
example, the ECB consolidates the banking businesses between European 
countries, provides grants derived of credits and assess market risk. It is important 
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the less developed economies of Western Europe, in particular: Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece (2) and now towards the new members of the Union from the 
former ex socialist Eastern European block (3). Furthermore, these kinds of 
institutions cannot be observed in any other type of regionalism outside the old 
continent which as consequence created unequal development among neighboring 
countries that shared common borders as it can notably seen in North America 
with NAFTA and South America with MERCOSUR. In the context of MERCOSUR it is 
a case of a commercial agreement between divergent countries. On the one hand, 
there are Brazil and Argentina; both of them are powerful economies with high 
levels of technological development. On the other hand, Uruguay and Paraguay 
are relatively small economies and much less powerful in the economic and 
political scenario in comparison to their neighboring countries. Furthermore, there 
is a remarkable lack of assistant institutions that contribute to obtaining equal 
levels of development among MERCOSUR's member states, and the economies of 
the small countries depend strongly of the economical behavior of the larger ones. 
Often the economic and political interests of these two types of economies are in 
deep contradiction. In this scope, a well defined strategy to continue or not within 
the block, could have high potential as a source of power and negotiation for the 
weakest members, or as the theory of game epithet for the countries with 
``imperfect information". This strategy must be chosen by them, as a 
consequence of the fact that big economies could ignore some norms established 
within the agreement, so if small countries continue within the block it could 
seriously encumber them, particularly in their economic and social welfare. In this 
scenario the following questions arise: 
  (A) How can small countries punish or avoid deviations of the most 
powerful members of an economic or political block, when these blocks have weak 
institutions or a panel of controversies to punish or reproof their deviations? (4). 
(B) How could small countries such as Uruguay and Paraguay indicate their 
interest when they face such an enormous asymmetry with respect to Brazil and 
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as Mexico defend what was agreed when it is relatively weak compared to the 
economic or technological interests of United States or Canada? 
In this context we assess this conflictive situation in the framework of game 
theory. In particular we will introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium, to define an 
optimal strategy for the small economies. The Nash equilibrium is a rule that 
requires that each player chooses a strategy maximizing its returns, assuming that 
the other players would play in accordance with the established equilibrium. 
Nobody regrets to have taken a decision made when all players agreed with this 
rule. The reason an equilibrium could not be established is given by the existence, 
in the equilibrium path, of an information set which is not reached, but if it is 
attained, then to play according to the equilibrium implies some kind of 
irrationality. If an information set is reached and the possibility is established to do 
so, then there is an equilibrium path; that which could continue within the 
equilibrium path is a strategy that does not maximize its utility (6). According to 
the Treaty of Asuncion of 1999 it was agreed that all member states of MERCOSUR 
should coordinate their monetary policies, as well as, other common economic 
policies (7), that could seriously affect not only the smallest economies, but also 
the larger ones. Nevertheless, this compromise was broken in 2001, when Brazil 
devaluated its currency, despite the fact that, as mentioned before, it was agreed 
in the treaty that it was prohibited to do so. In this case the best thing to do for 
Argentina was also to devaluate. Nevertheless, it did not do so because at that 
moment the Argentine government had a strong commitment to the so called "the 
convertibility policy'' i.e. one Argentine peso was equivalent to one American dollar 
(8). This economic measure made by Brazil could imply strong and bad 
repercussions towards the economy of Uruguay and Paraguay. For this reason is 
not clear at least, if it is optimal or not for an economy as large as Brazil's, to 
continue within MERCOSUR and to maintain economic highly preferential 
agreements with two small economies such as the aforementioned ones, due to 
the fact that, as mentioned before, could seriously harm its economy (9). Without 
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industrial branches they have similar levels of development (10). So it is mutually 
beneficial for both countries to maintain and to develop agreements for the 
production in scale of different goods, like those of the automotive industry. 
However, in the short or in the long term, if for big economies such as Argentina 
and Brazil, to maintain agreements with two small economies such as Uruguay and 
Paraguay, would hamper them, then the most likely thing to happen is that they 
will not respect what was agreed in any the Treaty of Asuncion. In this context, 
from the game theory it suggests that the best rational choice for small economies 
such as Paraguay and Uruguay is to threaten developed economies as Brazil and 
Argentina to leave MERCOSUR and to join some other types of regionalism as well 
as to build strong economic partnerships with other regions like the UE or north 
American countries such as Canada, the US or Mexico, as a sine qua non element 
in order that the Treaty must be respected. In this vein, Uruguay and Paraguay 
can seriously hamper Brazil in the sphere of its foreign policy. As it underlined by [ 
Soarez de Lina, M. (2007)] one of Brazil's major priorities today is to be the leading 
power of South America, therefore, if Uruguay and Paraguay leave MERCOSUR and 
for instance join NAFTA or become very close partners of the EU, it could seriously 
damage Sao Paulo's foreign policy. 
 
The game theory: Cases with asymmetric 
information 
 
The concept of sub game perfect equilibrium (SGPE) is a perfection of the 
concept of Nash equilibrium, for extensive game models [Fudemberg, D. and J. 
Tirole (1991)]. In order to play according to the framework of the SGPE, implies 
that in each information set, that is a singleton (i.e. and information set with only 
one node), each player would play in a rational way, maximizing its utility 
understanding that all players would play according to this strategy. In some 
cases, in which some type of asymmetries between players exists, the concept of 
SGPE is not satisfactory, see [Selten, R. (1975)]. This situation is particularly clear 
  4for games with no perfect information in these cases, the SGPE may involve 
irrationality. The concept of Nash equilibrium is related to a strategic profile such 
that every player maximizes its utilities when the other player play according with 
this profile, however to be a more restrictive concept, the same is true for the 
SGPE. Moreover, it is possible that a SGPE prescribe a no maximizing strategy from 
any information set such that will be not reached if everyone plays according to 
the equilibrium. Hence to play according with this equilibrium-strategy could be not 
rational if this information set is reached. Suppose that some player deviates from 
the equilibrium strategy and that, from this deviation one information set such that 
would not be reached if all players follow the equilibrium path is actually reached. 
So the rational player that plays in this information set does not need, necessarily, 
to choose according to the previously established equilibrium path. Moreover to 
defect can be even better. Therefore, this kind of Nash equilibrium is generally not 
sensible; the well-known cases involving not credible thr e a t  h a v e  t h i s  k i n d  o f  
irrationality. It is true that the concept of SGPE allows us to eliminate many cases 
of Nash equilibrium which have irrationality in some information set, but it is not 
enough to eliminate all cases of irrationality in information sets with null probability 
to be reached following an equilibrium strategy. The concept of SGPE prescribes 
irrationality at each information set which is a singleton. In each of these nodes 
each player would play according to this equilibrium path choosing according to 
the principle of maximization of utility. This restriction to a singleton information 
set is necessary to ensure that the utility after this information set is well defined. 
But this restriction has as consequence that the payoff will be not well defined 
after this information set and so, this opens the possibility of irrationality after any 
information set with multi-nodes. It can happen that if this set is reached, a player 
playing according to the equilibrium path does not maximize its utility, so and 
incentive to deviate appears, i.e. it can happen that if a player continues to play 
according to the equilibrium strategic profile, then it could be not playing according 
to the maximizing utility strategy, therefore it would be better to deviate. This 
situation represents the case in which Brazil devaluates and Argentina devaluates 
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agreement. 
We suppose that the players involved in an extensive-form game agree to 
play according a Nash- equilibrium φ  where there is perfect equilibrium in its sub-
games. We also assume that at a given moment a player faces a situation 
(information set, in terms of game theory) which cannot be achieved if all the 
players had agreed φ . The player, before continuing the game will try to 
understand this deviation. But many times the player will not be able to construct 
what led him to this situation. This happens when the player has not enough 
information, in order to make a decision on the different alternatives regarding the 
present situation. In terms of game theory, we say that a player is under a set of 
information formed by several nodes, in other terms there are different ways -one 
or some- that could lead to that condition and that he cannot evaluate. In front of 
this possibility, he will assume rationally a probability distribution on the set of 
possible nodes, or on the set of alternatives to end this situation. This probability 
distribution represents its beliefs or uncertainty on the game for the player about 
the node in which he stands. From this point, he will play according to these 
beliefs searching the maximization of expected utility. If each player acts according 
to this rule, none of them will have incentives for a bias from the expected path. 
The possibility of a bias from this path of equilibrium φ  is in the possibility that he 
supposes the existence of a set of information that is not achieved when the game 
is played according to the equilibrium, but a deviation allows to achieve this, when 
the player acts according to the equilibrium previously agreed upon, implying an 
additional gain for the bias player. In this sense, it will be better for the players to 
follow the game according to a given probability system (mixed strategies, in game 
theory terms) that do not uncover totally their plans, than do so following an 




  6Modelling economic and political facts 
 
The prospect of the game theory Suppose that a country, U , receives an 
important flux of tourists coming from two large nearby countries, B  and  A. Also 
let us suppose that these three countries were committed to the policy of to not 
devaluate their respective currencies. If  A and B  devaluate their currencies with 
respect to the dollar, and if U  does not follow this policy then, the flux of tourists 
from  A and B  to U  decreases and consequently the income of U  decreases also 
but the economy of  A and B  improve because the investment of the possible 
tourists remains now in their own countries. So, it can happen that  A and B  ha 
incentives to deviate. In this case the alternative for U  in order to maintain the 
flux of tourists would be to devaluate also. But if fourth countries will devaluate, all 
the economies will be worse off than in the case where these countries follow the 
policy of not devaluating. However the worst scenario for U  is to play according to 
the agreement when  A and B  have devaluated. If B  does not devaluate, then 
the consequence of this policy followed by  A will be for U  of smaller importance, 
because the flow of originating tourists form B  will be received for U  and we are 
assuming that B  is the greater economy. If B  devaluates, and  A does not 
devaluate U  will receive the flow of tourist coming from  A this situation indeed is 
not the best but it is not the worst of U . Suppose that  A and B  can defect and 
this situation could be unknown by U . Then U  needs to build a policy that allows 
it to prevent this possibility, because this defection can be very bad for their 
interests. As we can show the best policy for small countries is to threaten big 
economies to leave the block. This recommendation is inspired in [Selten, R. 
(1975)]. These threats, if credible, would protect the countries with incomplete 
information (or less developed economies) to possible defections. 
Suppose that in a commercial block there are three countries,  A,  B  and U  
(see figure).  
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Suppose also that  A and B  are big countries sharing information. U  is a 
small or poorly informed country. Each one needs to choose between devaluating 
 or not devaluating   his own money. Suppose that the countries have agreed 
to play 
d nd
) , , ( = nd nd nd φ  and this strategic profile is a SGPE. Assume that starting 
the game B  plays, and that it must to choose between   or  . But only  d nd A 
knows the election of B , because the information set of  A is reached if and only if 
B  has followed the action of  . In this moment  d A must to make his election. If 
this election is   the game is over and every country has and utility equals 1. In 
another case, U  plays, but it does not know if its information set is reached from 
an history starting with 
nd
B  choosing   (does not matter the elections of  nd A 
because in this case the information set of  A is not reached) or from the history 
. In the first case its optimal election to play   according to  ). , ( d d nd φ , and the 
returns for each country   are given by the vector  . In the  ) , , ( U A B R R R (3,2,2)
  8second case it is better for U  to choose   i.e. to deviate with respect to the 
agreement 
, d
φ . Suppose that U  plays  , then the vector of returns is (4,4,0)  and if 




B  prefers to play  , because it knows that  d A knows that it has 
played  , because only in this case the information set of  d A is reached. On the 
other hand,  A knows that U  has no form to know if his information set is reached 
because the agreement was respected or because B  and  A are defecting. Despite 
that the better situation is that nobody devaluates given that the other players 
playing do not devaluate, and that φ  is a SGPE, players have incentives to deviate. 
For each country, to follow the strategic profile  ) , , ( = nd nd nd φ  is optimal if the 
others are playing according to φ . Nevertheless players have incentive to deviate. 
This incentive originates from the imperfection in the information of U , i.e., 
because it has two nodes, and then in the moment to play, it does not know where 
i t  i s  e x a c t l y .  I t  k n o w s  t h a t  i t  i s  i t s  t u r n  t o  p l a y  b u t  i t  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  p e r f e c t  
information about the previous history so, B  and  A can deviate from the strategy 
φ  and each one plays   and U  is not able to know this deviation. If this deviation 
is played and U  maintains the agreement because it ignores such defection, then 
the payoff will be   an this is the worst result for U  and the best for 
d
(4,4,0) B  and 
A. Hence, an agreement to play   is not self-enforcing, and therefore, 
the equilibrium   is not sensible. Therefore, to obtain a self-enforcing 
equilibrium U  needs to play according to a mixed strategy, i.e. to follow a strategy 
implying to play with positive probability does not maintain the agreement 
equivalently, to threat with to play   with positive probability. To do this with 
success it needs to choose a mixed strategy where the probability to maintain the 
agreement is smaller than 
) , , ( nd nd nd




. In this case the result of the game will be that B  
plays  ,  d A plays   and U  plays a mixed strategy with  nd
4
1
< ) (nd p , i.e. the 
strategic profiles  )) ( ), ( ( (0,1); ((1,0); = nd p d p φ  with   are sensible SGPE.  1/4 < ) (nd p
  9This means that B  plays  ,  d A plays   and U  plays with a strictly mixed 
strategy. The returns for each country will be (1,1,1) . Certainly this is not the best 
situation, the payoff associated with the strategy 
nd
φ  are   but, it is the best 
self-enforcing strategy for U , given the structure of the game, in particular the 
fact that U  has no perfect information. This loss of welfare is a consequence of 
the existence of asymmetric information. We can conclude that for a poorly 
informed country it is preferable to announce an ambiguous political strategy with 
respect to its fidelity with the block. In this way the big economies will play 
according to the previous agreement; certainly this solution implies a second best 






In cases when there exist asymmetries (for instance in information) among 
countries that had signed economic or political agreement, or that join regional 
blocks, there can exist incentives for the big countries to deviate from the norms 
established within the agreement. If there are not panels of controversies strong 
enough to establish penalties for deviating, the most probable result is that, in 
cases when big economies can be seriously hurt if they maintain the agreements 
then, they will not respect the rules previously established (8). Hence, for countries 
that can be affected by political or economic decisions of the other, better 
informed countries, their optimal choice could be to threaten well informed 
countries or big economies, when for political and economic reasons, such blocks 
are of extreme importance, to leave the block and join another. This is what in 
game theory is called a mixed strategy with a credible threat. Certainly, for this 
threat to have a response it needs to be extremely credible for the big economies. 
Alternatively to this situation agreements must force all players involved to make 
public all information available or to create institutions that main objectives to 
create order, equilibrium and prosperity among countries that shared such an 
  10agreement, as we tried to show within the case of the EU. After this threat large 
countries will be not sure if small countries will be staying or leaving the 
agreement so, the great economies facing this threat will also follow a policy that 
is transparent for everyone so there will be no incentives to deviate. Without this 
threat the better informed countries could have incentives to deviate and hurt the 
less informed countries. Nevertheless, to have a profound impact these threats 
must be credible. In the case of Uruguay and Paraguay within MERCOSUR the 
optimal strategy is the following: to stay or to leave MERCOSUR, join for instance 
NAFTA, or become very close in the economically or politically with the EU. This is 
a credible threat, particularly now when Brazil is transforming its foreign policy in 




(1) The term economic security connotes what some social scholars 
underline as economic growth, equal foreign trade, join economic blocks and not 
be isolated from foreign trade. All these factors will contribute to stability and 
prosperity, to be excluded from them, could mean civil wars, military conflicts 
between neighboring countries, and social instability. The Complex Security Theory 
is a theory that took remarkably importance after the end of the Cold War, it was 
created by the Copenhagen School of thought, and it author is Woitech Kotescki, 
this theory allude to new forms that could created insecurity between neighboring 
countries, and one of the most important issues that assesses Kotesscki is the big 
differences between economic growth and prosperity among economies that 
shared common borders. More information in [Kostecki, W. (1996)]. 
(2) After the fall of communism in Europe the Central European countries 
such as Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic face weak and 
poor economic growth in the framework of their transition period, after joining the 
EU their economic growth increase even to 7 of their GNP. Furthermore, according 
to AT Korneey in 2005 they were considered among the fourth most attractive 
emerging markets in order for direct foreign investment, El Financiero, December 
17th, Mexico, 2007. 
(3) Among another EU´s institutions that assist the Union's member states 
to accomplish the objectives of an economic and social equilibrium between the 
largest and the smallest countries are the following: The European Investment 
Bank (EIB), and as aforementioned before, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and 
the European Regional and Development Fund (ERDF). The first institution 
provides financing for capital investments towards regional development in the 
framework of transport, telecommunications, energy, research, education, health 
  11and environment improvement. Another of its tasks is to facilitate integration, and 
to find balance in terms of development and economic cohesion among the 
member states. The second constitutes one of the Union's main strategies for 
supporting social and restructuring across member states. Between both 
institutions manage for over one third of the EU budget. In short, one of their main 
tasks is used to minimize regional disparities and support regional development 
towards the development of infrastructure, human resources, telecommunications, 
research and development. In addition, these assist geographical areas that are in 
a very different level of development in comparison to the developed regions of 
the Union. Finally, the third institution, the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), which its main objective is to provide assistance in the form of grants 
towards project, costs. 
(4) The Argentina's decision to change the agreement in order to import 
cars, goods information, and capital goods at the beginning of July, after de 
Asuncion Meeting puts under high tension in the relations among the members of 
the MERCOSUR. For example, Brazil stooped all bilateral talk negotiations with 
Argentina and requested the Ministry of Economy of Argentina to rethink about its 
new importation rules. 
(5) Brazil is today one of the biggest economies in the world, according to 
the World Bank it is ranked as the eight economy of the world, see Global 
Economic Prospect, published by the World Bank in 2007. 
(6) The basic assumption underlying the concept of rational behavior is the 
concept of rational behavior given in [Savage, L. J. (1954)]. Every player who has 
make a choice under uncertainty will construct a personal probability for every 
future event about him is uncertain and he will maximize expected utility given 
these Probability. 
(7) It was agreed to coordinated macroeconomic and structural policies 
among MERCOSUR member states in the following areas: foreign Trade, 
agricultural, fiscal, services, transport, communications, custom s union, and 
industrial policies, monetary and exchange rates policies, among others that assure 
equal competition towards MERCOSUR member states. Likewise, as in the 
European Union, it was agreed the legal harmonization of MERCOSUR member 
states in order to strength its further integration. 
(8) The devaluation in Brazil, the fall of the Convertibility in Argentina and 
the chaotic devaluation of the 2000, did not affect commercial relations between 
its greater partners. It is important to underline that the weight of commercial 
relations between Argentina and Brazil, represents an important percentage of 
their respective GDP. 
(9) The government of Brazil, accepted the proposal of Argentina in order to 
established a compensation mechanism, in order to minimize the economic impact 
that Brazil evaluation could have towards its currency, as well as, towards the 
currencies of Uruguay and Paraguay. The decision to make common steps was 
made because of the following deviation faced by Brazil's currencies, for example 
between January and the dollar yesterday happened to cost 1.95 real ones to 2.72 
  12real ones. Thus in which it goes of the year, in Brazil the dollar increased in price a 
39.5% In the same period raises it of the internal prices (inflation) was of as soon 
as 5%. This way, measured in dollars, the Brazilian production costs lowered the 
price of around 30% [Clarín.com. (2001)]. 
(10) The official panels of controversies of MERCOSUR are focus to react 
towards any controversies that could arise between its member states, or between 
private individuals, arising of noncompliance with the provisions of the Asuncion 
Treaty, or from the agreements executed under its scope, or even from decisions 
made by the Common Market Council and resolutions taken by the Common 
Market Group. In 1994, member states established a definitive system for the 
settlement of disputes that could be explained as follows. First, direct a 
negotiation, which in short means bilateral negotiations between member states. 
Second, intervention of the Common Market Group (CMG), that means that if 
direct negotiations an agreement is not reached between the member states, 
member states may submit the matter for the examination to the CMG, and 
request outside advice from specialists; and four the arbitration procedure, that 
means that if an agreement is nor reached through the CMG, any of the member 
states may request the Administrative office of the Common Market Group institute 
for its arbitration. In this case, each member state will appoint ten arbitrators to be 
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